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ter decisions if it also held some equity in bor-
rowing firms.1 According to this theory a bank
that holds an equity share in firms to which it
lends would strike a more sensible balance be-
tween caution and risk-taking and would also
be more concerned about its borrower’s long-
termfinancialhealth.TheGramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 modestly expands bank powers to
hold equity in nonfinancial firms, but it stops
wellshortofpermittingbankstoholdmixeddebt-
*Mitchell Berlin is an economic advisor in the Research
Department of the Philadelphia Fed.
1See the article by James Barth, Daniel Nolle, and Tara
Rice for a comparison of international restrictions on bank
equity holdings and Christopher James’s 1995 article for
a discussion of U.S. laws governing bank equity holdings
in distressed firms. Loretta Mester’s article provides a
general overview of the issues involved in the separation
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equity claims as a normal lending practice, as
wouldbepermitted,forexample,inGreatBrit-
ainorGermany.
Are banks in the United States really shack-





and too harsh when a borrower experiences fi-
nancialdifficulties?AndifU.S.regulationswere
relaxed, would we see a stampede by banks to
takeownershipstakesintheirborrowers?
Evidencefromaroundtheworldsuggeststhat
the answer to all these questions is no. Even in
thosenationswherebanksarefreetotakeequity
stakes, they mostly specialize in making loans
andholdonlysmallequitystakesinborrowing
firms — when they hold any equity at all. And
incountrieswherebanksdoholdequity,theevi-
dence says that it usually has little to do with
theprescriptionsoftraditionaltheory.Nonethe-
less, recent work by financial economists helps
explain why a bank that only makes loans may
bemoreeffectivethanonethatholdsbothdebt
and equity in the same firm. Banks play a spe-







Traditional Finance Theory Holds That
Banks Should Hold Mixed Claims...The con-
flictbetweenstockholdersanddebtholdersisone
ofthekeyideasinmodernfinance.Theunderly-
ing conflict can be stated simply: Stockholders
prefer excessively risky investments, and
debtholdersareexcessivelycautious.Thesepref-
erences flow from differences in how the hold-
ersofeachtypeofsecurityarepaid.Stockhold-
ersownthefirm’sprofitswhenitdoeswell,but




The conflict is most severe when a firm is near
bankruptcy. Stockholderswouldpreferthatthe
firmrollthedice(becausetheyhavelittletolose),
and debtholders would prefer that the firm’s





the same proportions as the firm’s debt-equity
ratio.Thisinvestor’sdecisionswouldthenrep-
resent the interests of all investors in the firm,
because any policy that increases the value of
thisinvestor’sclaim—whichmirrorsthefinan-






...But Banks Mostly Specialize in Lending.








but in many countries, banks hold less equity
thancanbeexplainedbyregulatoryrestrictions.
For example, banks in Great Britain, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands hold virtually no
equity in borrowing firms, although they are
permittedtodosobytheEuropeanCommunity’s
SecondBankingDirective.2
2The European Community’s Second Banking Direc-
tive imposes no direct restrictions on a bank’s share of a
firm’s equity, but it limits a bank’s qualifying investments
in any one firm to 15 percent of the bank’s own funds and
also limits total qualifying investments across all firmsWhy Don't Banks Take Stock? Mitchell Berlin
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lending dominates the international banking
picture,whateverregulatoryrestrictionsapply.
Weshouldbecarefulindrawingtoomanycon-
clusions from the aggregate numbers. The fig-
ureshidealotofvariationinequityholdingsby
individual banks, and even for any particular
bank, the composition of its holdings in indi-
vidual firms will vary. One possibility is that
banksconcentratetheirequityholdingsinthose
firmsthatofferthegreatestbenefits.Sincemost
countries place some restrictions on banks’ eq-
uity stakes in firms, banks may decide to hold
no stock in those firms in which stockholder-
debtholder conflicts are small and hold signifi-
cant equity shares in those firms in which such
conflicts are most severe and the bank can do
themostgood. Forexample,abankmighthold
little or no stock in a firm under routine finan-
cial conditions and substantially increase its








to 60 percent of the bank’s own funds. (A qualifying
investment is an equity stake in excess of 10 percent of a
firm’s stock, and a bank’s own funds roughly approxi-
mates regulatory capital.) However, formal regulations
may not fully capture the constraints on banks’ behavior
in Great Britain and elsewhere. For example, according
to Herwig Langohr and Anthony Santomero, banks in
Great Britain may be subject to implicit restrictions by
the Bank of England.
TABLE
Bank Stockholdings in the
EU and G-10 Countries, 1996
Country Number Loans/ Shares/
of Commercial Assets Assets
Banks (percent) (percent)
Austria 1019 51 4
Belgium 100 35 2
Canada 11 67 0
Denmark 117 42 4
Finland 8 49 6
France 400 32 3
Germany 258 56 5
Greece 20 31 5
Italy 264 40 2
Japan 136 66 5
Luxembourg 221 19 0
Netherlands 172 64 1
Portugal 39 33 0
Spain 165 42 4
Sweden 15 38 3
Switzerland 85 45 5
United Kingdom 44 55 0
UnitedStates 9575 64 0
Sources: Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks
1998, OECD, and the article by Barth, Nolle, and Rice.
The United States stands alone in generally
prohibitingstockholdingbybanks,butevenU.S.
banking law gives banks some leeway to take
equity positions.3 However, specialization in
3The main exceptions to the general prohibition are
that (i) banks may take substantial equity positions in
borrowers that are financially distressed; (ii) bank hold-
ing companies (BHCs) may take noncontrolling posi-
tions in startups through small business investment cor-
porations; and (iii) BHCs may engage in “merchant
banking” through investment banking subsidiaries of the
holding company. Thus, Citibank (the bank) can’t en-
gage in merchant banking, but Citigroup (the BHC) can
provide this service through its investment banking sub-
sidiary, Salomon Smith Barney. Merchant banking gener-
ally refers to taking temporary, noncontrolling owner-
ship positions in nonfinancial firms. Under the terms of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which first permit-
ted merchant banking for BHCs, bank regulators may
revisit the restrictions on merchant banking activities af-
ter five years. Specifically, regulators may decide that a
bank could offer merchant banking services through a
subsidiary of its own.6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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ture includes a concentrated equity stake (or
block), more often owned by a single family or
nonfinancial firm than by a bank.4 Harald
Roggenbuck’sstudyofbankequitystakesfound
thatonlyasmallnumberofcasesinvolvedbanks’
taking equity in financially troubled firms. In
his sample, the main reason a bank took an eq-
uitypositionwasthatthefirm’sowners(ortheir
heirs)wantedtosellsharestodiversifytheirown
portfolios without breaking up the block. This
evidence is buttressed by Jeremy Edwards and
KlausFischer’ssurveyofGermanbankers,who




in the United States when borrowers enter fi-
nancial distress. Even though U.S. banks have
substantial legal rights to take equity positions
in distressed firms for long periods, banks ap-
pearveryreluctanttotakeequitystakes. Banks
are especially reluctant when their loan is col-
lateralized — that is, when the bank can seize
particularassetsofthefirmshouldthefirmde-
fault — or when the firm has nonbank bond-
holders.
In Japan, a financially troubled firm’s main
bank has often taken a claim subordinated to
the claims of the firm’s other creditors, appar-
entlyaspartofanunwrittenagreementthatthe
firm’smainbankshouldbearthecostsofitsown
mistakes.5 In other words, the other creditors
wouldberepaidbeforethemainbank.6 Butthe
historical record of banks’ accumulation of eq-
uity positions is actually equivocal. Paul
Sheard’s study shows that Japanese banks sig-
nificantlyincreasedtheirstockholdingsinfirms
in the early 1960s and again in the 1970s, in
large part to guard against takeovers of affili-
ated firms. But bank stockholdings to prevent




and equity, especially when stockholder-
debtholder conflicts are magnified by financial
distress, the weight of the empirical evidence
raises two related questions: Why do we see
banksspecializingsomuchinloans,evenwhen
regulatoryconstraintsarenotbinding?Whatare
the barriers to banks’ willingness to exchange
debt for equity in distressed firms? Remember
thatadistressedfirmneednotbeapoorinvest-
ment.Evenfirmswithattractivelong-termpros-
pects may suffer financial difficulties. In this
situation, an informed creditor willing to take




When a Bank Has Priority Debt, Why Take
Equity? James’s evidence seems to offer a




cial distress. This makes sense. Why would a
collateralizedlendergiveupitscontractualright
4In a study of large German firms with a majority
shareholder, B. Iber found that in 1983 families owned
22.6 percent of the firms and nonfinancial enterprises
owned 11.3 percent of the firms, while banks owned only
8.0 percent of the firms. In earlier years, families’ share
was larger and banks’ share was smaller.
5W. Carl Kester’s article provides an interesting ac-
count of the web of implicit agreements that have tradi-
tionally bound Japanese banks and their borrowers.
6The subordination of the main bank’s claim hasn’t
typically taken the form of an exchange of debt for eq-
uity, which is the most subordinate claim, in that all
creditors must be repaid before stockholders receive any
payments. More typically, the firm’s main bank and
other large lenders have purchased the debt claims of
smaller lenders. This type of behavior may not survive
the current liberalization and restructuring of the Japa-
nese financial system.Why Don't Banks Take Stock? Mitchell Berlin
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to seize a defaulting firm’s inventories, or per-
haps the deed to its borrower’s office building,
in exchange for shares of potentially worthless
stock? Collateralusuallygivesthebankpriority
overthefirm’sothercreditors,whichmeansthat
it is the first in line to receive payments should
theborrowergobankrupt. Inbankruptcy,lend-
ers with uncollateralized loans share only the
valueofthoseassetsthathavenotalreadybeen
pledged to lenders with collateralized loans.
Andtheholderofanequityclaimhasthelowest





made by an evolving sample of U.S. banks, ap-
proximately 75 percent of all loans (by value)
made each quarter are collateralized. For Ger-
many,EdwardsandFischersummarizesurvey
evidence from a number of studies that show
that nearly 100 percent of long-term loans and
70percentofshort-andmedium-termloans(by
value)arecollateralized.8
Actually, collateral isn’t the only feature of
bankloansthatgivesthebankeffectivepriority
overothercreditors.Banksusuallymakeshort-










some minimum level acts as a tripwire, giving
thebankachancetoimproveitspositionatother
creditors’ expense, perhaps by reducing its ex-
posureorbytakingcollateral.
CaseClosed! OrMaybeNot...Whilethepri-
ority of bank claims certainly helps explain
banks’ reluctance to take equity in distressed
firms, this answer isn’t completely satisfactory
becauseitimmediatelyposesanotherpuzzle. If
the bank’s unwillingness to work flexibly with
adistressedfirmisapredictableconsequenceof
having a collateralized loan, why does the firm
accept this type of financing? In a competitive
financialmarket,asintheUnitedStates,itseems
sensible that a firm should be able to find bank
lenderswillingtoofferanunsecuredloan. Why
don’tthey?




answer. Giving the bank a priority claim may
lowertheratethefirmpaysforbankcredit.How-
ever,thefirm’sothercreditors—suppliersthat
provide trade credit or bondholders — lose in
bankruptcy what the bank gains, so bondhold-
ers with lower priority will demand a higher
interestrate,andsupplierswillprovidelessgen-
erousfinancingterms.Intheory,thehigherbor-
rowing costs for nonbank financing should di-
rectlyoffsetanysavingsfromthelowerrateona
bank loan. If giving one creditor priority over
anotherismeanttoreducetotalborrowingcosts,
someone’s behavior must be affected in a way
thatmakesthefirmabettercreditrisk.
7This order of priority — known as the absolute prior-
ity rule — is not always strictly observed in practice,
especially under U.S. bankruptcy law, which gives a bank-
rupt firm’s top management significant power to influ-
ence the terms of the settlement. A firm’s stockholders
often leave bankruptcy proceedings with a positive eq-
uity stake even though noncollateralized creditors have
not received their full contractual payments.
8Of course, the contractual right to seize collateral is
not worth much if legal protections for collateralized
lenders are weak. In the United States and Germany, the
empirical evidence says that collateralized claims are
well protected. For example, Lawrence Weiss found that
in a sample of Chapter 11 reorganizations, secured credi-
tors received 100 percent of the face value of their claim
in 33 out of 37 cases. Edwards and Fischer survey the
evidence for Germany.8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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Priority and the Economics of Hostages.9 A
useful way to analyze priority is to think about
the economics of hostages. In the Persian em-
pire,conqueredkingswouldsendtheirsonsor




















ible. Indeed, Persian rulers had little difficulty
maintaining credibility: What was the life of a
foreignprinceworthtothePersianemperor? But
in the case of a loan contract, a borrower may
havegoodreasontoquestionthecredibilityofa
creditor’s threat to impose default and to take
ownership of the firm’s assets, especially since
theassetsareoftenworthlessiftheyareseized
and resold than if the borrower stays in opera-
tion. For example, the borrower’s main asset
may be inventories of unsold goods. With an
establishednetworkofretailers,evenafirmex-
periencing financial problems can reasonably
expecttosellitsgoodsmoreefficientlyandgeta
higherpricethanitscreditorscould.
The firm’s owner understands this and may
choose to take large risks using the following
reasoning: “If things turn out badly and I can’t
make my loan payments on time, my creditors
would be irrational to actually push me into
bankruptcy. AllIneedtodoisexplainthatwe’ll
all be better off if I retain the inventories, and
theywillrenegotiateandacceptlowerloanpay-
ments.”Ifthefirm’sownerreasonsthisway,the
threat to seize assets in default is not credible,




priority, its share of the firm’s assets when the
firmisindefaultislargerthanitsshareofallthe
funds initially loaned to the firm. Thus, even if
creditors with only proportional claims on the
defaulting firm’s assets would rationally back
away from pushing the firm into bankruptcy,
the bank — with a disproportionately large share
of the value of the defaulting firm’s assets — is
more likely to take a hard line in the face of the
borrower’sentreatiestorenegotiatethecontract.
Thebankhasacrediblethreattoseizeandliqui-
date the firm’s assets — that is, to kill the hos-
tage — should the firm breach the terms of the
debt contract. Recognizing this, the firm will
takegreaterprecautionstoavoiddefault.
Thebank’spriorityoverthefirm’sothercredi-
tors is not just a transfer between claimants; it
changesboththecreditors’andfirm’sbehavior
in a fundamental way. In particular, priority
makes the bank a very hard bargainer and the
enforcer of a hard budget constraint. In turn, this
imposesmoredisciplineonthefirm,butthefirm
readilyacceptsthedisciplinebecausetotalbor-
rowing costs are lower when creditors know
theirinvestmentissafer.Ironically,bypressing
its own interests at the expense of other claim-
ants’, a bank with a priority claim increases
everyone’sreturns.
Howwouldamixeddebt-equityclaimaffect
the bank’s behavior? Equity contracts have the
9The material in this section synthesizes some of the
insights in articles by Eric Berglöf and Ludwig von
Thadden and by Mathias Dewatripoint and Jean Tirole.
See Stanley Longhofer and João Santos’s article for a
good survey of theories explaining the priority of bank
loans.Why Don't Banks Take Stock? Mitchell Berlin
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lowest priority among all claims. So, any stock
heldbythebankwouldreducethebank’sshare
ofthefirm’sassetsinbankruptcy,thusreducing
its willingness to press the firm to liquidate. A
bank holding equity in the firm would be less









able as an ongoing business. And there is sub-
stantial empirical evidence that the
renegotiabilityofbankdebtisofsignificantben-
efittofirms.10
Actually, there is no contradiction between
banks enforcing hard budget constraints and
alsofacilitatingrenegotiation.Havingabiasto-
ward liquidation, rather than renegotiation,
doesn’t mean that banks and their borrowers
would never renegotiate. When renegotiation
occurs,however,abankwithprioritywilltakea
hard bargaining stance, and a significant share
ofanyexpectedfutureprofitswillendupinthe








Banks play a special role in producing and
communicating information about the firms to
whichtheylend.Thetypeoffinancialclaimheld
by a bank can affect its ability to communicate
information to others, especially when a bor-
rowerexperiencesfinancialtroubles.Inparticu-
lar, a bank with a significant equity stake in a
borrowingfirmwillnotbeviewedasacredible
sourceofinformationabouttheborrower’scred-





enter into a business relationship.12 Sources
includepublishedinformation,suchasDunand
Bradstreet,butalsomoreinformalones,suchas
lawyers or accountants, as well as the firm’s
other suppliers and customers. Traditionally,
banks have been a key source of reliable infor-
mation about borrowers because it is a bank’s
jobtobewellinformedaboutborrowers’finan-
cial affairs.
Consider Bend EZ Inc., a supplier of pros-
thetic joints that has maintained a profitable
business relationship with New Parts Medical
Supplies for nearly 10 years. Before signing the
first long-term supply contract, however, the
owner of Bend EZ contacted the New Parts’ re-
lationship manager at One-Stop Shop N’ Bank,
now a diversified financial supermarket (but,
originally, a bank). By calling the bank, Bend
EZ’sownersavedhisfirmthetimeandtrouble
ofcollectinginformationaboutanewcustomer.
Providing information to Bend EZ wasn’t par-
10James’s 1996 article provides evidence that banks
facilitate debt restructurings for distressed firms. See
my Business Review article for an introduction to the evi-
dence that an important feature of bank debt is that it is
renegotiable.
11The next two sections are drawn from my article
with Kose John and Anthony Saunders.
12The term fixed claimant includes both real claimants,
such as a supplier of copper pipes, and financial claim-
ants, such as bondholders. Fixed claimants, both real
and financial, have debt-like claims. The producer of
copper pipes with a five-year supply contract shares
many similarities with a bondholder: both get specified
payments as long as the firm keeps operating, but nei-
ther gets a share of the firm’s profits. In contrast, the
financial claim of the firm’s stockholders rises or falls in
value with the firm’s profits.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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ticularlycostlyforthebank,sinceShopN’Bank





municate New Parts’ creditworthiness to a po-
tential supplier. Indeed, this is one of the ser-
vices that the firm pays the bank to perform as
part of the lending relationship. So all parties
benefit from the bank’s role in disseminating
information.
While the bank’s informational role may be




ing environment, but the firm has adapted too
slowly and has been losing money for nearly
twoyears. Thefirstorderofbusinessforafirm
infinancialdistressisusuallytocutcosts. While
reusing paper clips or having executives fly
coachmaybeastart,financialtroublesinevita-
blytriggeraroundofnegotiationswiththefirm’s
usual suppliers and customers. These negotia-
tions may also extend to the firm’s financial







claimants don’t have first-hand knowledge of
thefirm’struecoststructure. Claimantswillbe








ingness to continue lending to New Parts con-
veys information about the firm’s continuing
creditworthiness. Actually, the bank’s willing-
ness to continue to provide funds is more elo-
quent about the firm’s prospects than a bill of
good health from its loan officer, since actions
speak louder than words.13 Similarly, Shop
N’Bank’s willingness to grant concessions also
conveys to Bend EZ that concessions really are
necessary for New Parts to stay in business.
WhenBendEZlearnsthatthebankhasrenego-
tiated its loan, the supplier can feel more confi-
dent that New Parts and its banker are not just
seeking to shift losses onto its suppliers.
...But a Bank with an Equity Stake May Be
Less Credible. Consider Bend EZ’s owner’s
thinkingwhenNewPartsproposessubstantial
price reductions after Shop N’Bank has ex-
changeditsloanforasignificantequitystakein
NewParts.Ontheonehand,thedebt-for-equity
exchange contains some good news. Since the
bank has not pushed its borrower into bank-
ruptcy, Bend EZ may reasonably infer that the
bankexpectsthefirmtosurvive.
However, as a fixed claimant, Bend EZ also
has reason to be suspicious. Now that Shop
N’BankhasbecomeastockholderinNewParts,
itprofitsdirectlyfromanyconcessionsmadeby
Bend EZ or by the firm’s other fixed claimants.
The supplier might reasonably imagine that
ShopN’BankandNewPartshavemadeaback
roomdealtoexpropriatethefirm’sfixedclaim-




bank and the firm before deciding whether to
makeconcessions,thebank’sfinancialclaimon
the distressed firm must take account of claim-
ants’ suspicions that the bank and firm have
(implicitlyorexplicitly)colludedtoexpropriate
13Multiple studies have documented a positive effect
on a firm’s stock price when its bank announces a new
loan or loan commitment. The article by Matthew Billett,
Jon Garfinkel, and Mark Flannery provides an excellent
review of this literature.Why Don't Banks Take Stock? Mitchell Berlin
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them. The bank’s renegotiated claim should be
designed to create conflicts of interest between
the bank and the firm’s owners; otherwise, the
bankcan’tserveasanhonestbrokertofacilitate
therenegotiationofthefirm’sfixedclaims.The
most straightforward way to do this is for the
banktoreducethefacevalueofitsloanwithout





Lenders in Control May Face Liability. In
many countries, under many different types of
legal systems, powerful and well-informed in-
vestors,includinglargelenders,oftenhavespe-
ciallegalresponsibilitiestowardtheborrower’s
other claimants. For example, in the United
States, an investor with a controlling share of a
firm’s stock has a fiduciary responsibility to the
firm’s smaller stockholders, bondholders, and
customers.15 Although the legal definition of a
fiduciary responsibility is very elastic — and
investors’actualresponsibilitiescandifferquite









lender liability called equitable subordination,a
doctrinethatpermitsabankruptcycourttosub-
ordinate the claim of a lender to that of other
claimants if the lender’s behavior was inequi-
14This section draws heavily on my working paper
with Loretta Mester.
15The idea of a fiduciary responsibility originates in
Roman law and concerns a trustee’s responsibility to act
in the interests of the beneficiary of an estate.
table. This means that the lender was respon-
sible for improper business decisions that im-
proved its own position at the expense of other
claimants’.
For example, Shop N’Bank may continue to
extend credit to New Parts merely to postpone
aninevitableliquidation.Allthewhile,thebank
may be telling Bend EZ that the firm is finan-
ciallyhealthywhilethebanktakesmorecollat-
eral. Or the bank may insist that New Parts liq-
uidatereceivablestopaydownaslargeashare
of its bank loan as possible while stringing out
payments to Bend EZ. Any of these behaviors








in its borrowing firm. In general, a lender that
becomestoocloselyinvolvedinthemanagement
ofthefirmriskshavingacourtviewitasacon-
trolling investor, which can undermine its pri-
ority should things turn out badly and the firm
gobankrupt.16 Infact,thebankinglawliterature
is chock full of cautionary tales about crossing
thelineintodirectmanagementoftheborrower’s
affairsandlistsofdosanddon’tsforthebanker




the bank is a controlling investor.
The law draws a distinction between open-
ended control and normal creditor remedies;
actionsthatflowfromrightsgrantedbytheloan
16Similar lender liability doctrines appear in other le-
gal systems. The German bankers interviewed by
Edwards and Fischer said that the main reason for their
reluctance to exchange debt for equity is that their entire
claim, including debt claims, could be subordinated in
the event the borrowing firm ultimately fails.12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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contractarenotviewedascontrolintheeyesof








mind. If a lender goes beyond its explicit con-
tract with the borrower and if it also deviates
fromthecourt’sboilerplatecontract,itsrespon-







the bank and the firm isn’t directly observable.
Thispermitsallclaimantstoformaclearerpic-
ture of how the bank will act when firms enter
difficult times. And through court decisions,
bothbanksandotherclaimantslearnaboutthe
terms of the boilerplate contract as courts en-
counternovelsituations.
EquitableSubordinationAllowsClaimants
to Make Commitments. While the doctrine of
equitablesubordinationmayseemtobenothing
butarestrictiononlenders’opportunitiestocon-
tract freely, it also allows all claimants to make
commitmentstheyotherwisecouldn’tmake. As
long as a lender restricts its influence to rights
grantedunderitsloancontractandtostandard
creditor remedies, other claimants can’t effec-
tivelychallengethepriorityofthebank’sclaim.





potential liability depends on whether the
courts view the investor as in control, a term
thatishardtodefinewithanyprecisioneither
in economic or legal terms. Even a very pow-
erful lender may not be in control in the eyes
of the court. In general, influence exercised
according to the terms of an arm’s length
agreement won’t be viewed as control. An
arm’s length agreement is one freely entered
into by a borrower capable of representing
itsowninterests;thus,anagreementbetween
a healthy borrower and the bank would typi-
callybeviewedasanarm’slengthagreement.
For example, a fairly common loan cov-
enant allows the bank to demand immediate
repaymentifcertaintrustedtopmanagersare
replaced. This covenant is very intrusive by
anyone’s standards. But if the contract was
agreed upon at arm’s length, other creditors




liability, other claimants have no grounds to
challengethebank’spriority,evenifthefirm’s
assets are less valuable than the value of the
firm had it continued production.
However, the stringent legal standard for
viewing influence as control doesn’t offer the
bank blanket immunity. For example, con-
sider a distressed firm that has missed mul-
tiple loan payments (evidence that the firm
has negative net worth). If the bank insists on
the right of approval over future managers
as a precondition for further funding, the
courts may well view the bank as a control-
linginvestor. Unlikeinthepreviousexample,
thebank’sinfluenceovermanagementdidn’t
clearly arise as part of an arm’s length agree-
ment. In this case, the courts may look more




for rules and principles amid the details of
cases like these.
17Of course, there are multiple legal jurisdictions and
no two business transactions are truly identical, so the
idea of a single boilerplate contract that lenders and claim-
ants can consult underplays the uncertainty they face in
the real world.Why Don't Banks Take Stock? Mitchell Berlin
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withasecuredloanexercisesitscontractualright
to push a firm into default — the bank has pro-




But is this a good thing? And why view this
asanincreaseinotherclaimants’abilitytomake
commitments,ratherthanjustasarestrictionon
their rights? Recall the main argument for giv-
ingthebankpriorityinthefirstplace:Apriority
claimensuresthatthebankbenefitsdispropor-
tionately when the firm defaults. Thus, nearly
everydefaultwouldbegroundsforalegalchal-
lengeifimposingharmonotherclaimantswere
sufficient grounds for challenging the bank’s
priority. This situation would be good for the
lawyers, accountants, and economists paid to
advise the bankruptcy court, but it would use
uplotsoftimeandmoney.Also,therighttochal-
lenge and reopen contracts may lead claimants
to neglect simple, cost-effective precautions to
reduce the risks of a borrower’s or customer’s
default. For example, a bondholder can diver-
sifyhisorherportfolioandasuppliercanavoid
excessivedependenceonasinglecustomer.
In fact, all claimants may benefit if they can
make a prior commitment not to seek to undo
existing contracts in court, but writing lots of











and other institutional investors to hold mix-
tures of debt and equity, banks in the United
Statesandothercountriesdon’tseemtoholdas









to specialize in lending rather than holding
mixed claims. All investors may benefit when
the bank acts as a tough bargainer should the
firm experience financial problems, and tough
bargaining may require a priority debt claim.
Also, banks may avoid taking equity stakes in
distressedfirmstoreassureotherclaimantswho
watchthebank’snegotiationswiththefirmbe-
fore deciding whether they should make con-
cessions. A significant equity stake in the dis-
tressed firm may make other claimants suspi-
ciousthatthebankandthefirm’smanagersare
colluding to seek unnecessary concessions. Fi-
nally, lender liability tends to promote special-
ization by lenders, because blended financial
claims and open-ended interventions by lend-
ersmaytriggerliabilityandthreatenthepriority
oftheirdebtclaims.
These findings put traditional arguments
aboutthepotentialbenefitsandcostsofmixing
banking and commerce in some perspective. A
centralargumentofthosewhoopposerelaxing
the walls separating banking and commerce is
theconcernthatbankswithequitystakesinnon-
financial firms will feel compelled to bail out




18The safety net includes access to deposit insurance
and to the discount window. More broadly, banking
regulators stand ready to intervene if they determine
that problems at a financial institution threaten the sta-
bility of the financial system. See Loretta Mester’s article
for a full account of arguments that mixing banking and
commerce might inappropriately extend the safety net.14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA




by lender liability laws — that limit banks’ de-
sire to take large ownership positions in bor-
rowing firms. And these forces operate quite
strongly when borrowers are distressed, just




uity stakes in firms, either. The evidence does
not say that most banks are straining against
regulatory barriers to hold the stock of nonfi-
nancial firms. To the contrary, banks and their
borrowersoftenseemtoenforceaseparationof
banking and commerce voluntarily, in the nor-
malcourseofmakingcontractualagreements.
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